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The question posed in the title of the international conference organised by the 
Vienna Institute of Demography in 2007 seems to be increasingly on the minds of 
policy makers, the academic community and the public at large. This is 
understandable, given that throughout most of Europe, period fertility indicators 
have reached very low levels and countries are facing rapidly changing age 
structures along with the prospect of population decrease. The mixed evidence 
about the effect of existing policies aimed at influencing fertility and the growing 
number of countries throughout Europe pursuing such policies suggest that the 
question of whether policies can enhance fertility in Europe needs to be asked in 
conjunction with another question, namely whether it is worthwhile to pursue 
policies aimed at enhancing fertility, given the uncertainty of their outcome. This 
second question can be answered affirmatively, if policies contribute to having 
healthier, better educated future generations, parents can combine their work and 
family responsibilities more easily, these policies are fiscally and economically 
feasible and sustainable, respect all rights and freedoms and are coherent with the 
policies pursued in other domains. The last statement raises at least two additional 
questions. 
 
What are the benefits and at what cost? 
In view of the new demographic realities in Europe, it is often argued that doing 
nothing might be more harmful than taking policy action on the basis of 
incomplete information and erring in the process (see, for example, Špidla 2007). 
One of the assumptions behind such a position seems to be that family/fertility 
policies are good in themselves, so relatively little can go wrong. While agreeing 
that procrastination would be a mistake, I would argue that well-intentioned 
policies may sometimes have side effects that might (at least partly) overshadow 
their potential benefits. A classical example are parental leave provisions, one of 
the more widely used instruments of family/fertility policies.
1 In some European 
                                                 
∗ Nikolai Botev, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), Grosslingova 35, 81109 Bratislava, 
Slovakia. Email: botev@unfpa.org. Opinions expressed are those of the author and not 
necessarily those of the UNFPA.  
1   It should be noted that parental leave (i.e. all leave provisions associated with the bearing and 
rearing of children) is not exclusively a subject of family/fertility policies, but also involves the 
domains of labour market and gender policies. Consequently, such provisions do not 
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countries, parents can take up to three years parental leave and are entitled to 
return to the same job. However, without adequate professional re-integration 
measures and provisions to meet employers’ concerns, the leave could adversely 
affect the employability of women (who, notwithstanding all efforts to promote 
paternal involvement, account for 80 to 100 per cent of the time spent on parental 
leave) and undermine gender equality. Given the evidence that gender equality 
contributes to higher fertility in the current European context (Chesnais 1996; 
McDonald 2000), such policies could ultimately undermine their original goals. 
Hence some have referred to the gender effects of parental leave as a “poisoned 
chalice” or as a “Catch 22 dilemma” (see, for example, Moss and Deven 1999). 
Two cases of newly introduced policies offer further evidence of situations 
where side effects could partially overshadow the potential benefits of increased 
birth rates. For example, research on the recent pro-natalist policies in Russia 
suggests that while new measures will significantly increase the birth rate in the 
short run, they could generate waves of large and small cohorts, thus exacerbating 
the irregularities in the age structure of Russia’s population (Botev 2007). This 
will be the result of an ‘interference effect’, as the impact of the new incentives 
will, in the short run, coincide with an echo effect (the movement through 
reproductive ages of the large 1980s cohorts); then a birth dearth, driven by 
possible tempo changes generated by the policies, will coincide with the powerful 
negative growth momentum, which is building up in Russia as a result of one and 
a half decades of very low fertility. These side effects could have been avoided, or 
at least tapered, had the Russian government opted for a different timing of the 
policies and a different mix of measures (for more details see Botev 2007). 
The other case pertains to some countries’ efforts to influence the timing of 
births so as to reverse the trend towards postponing fertility and to increase period 
fertility indicators (see Lutz and Skirbekk 2005 for a more detailed discussion of 
tempo policies). These efforts are prompted by the fact that, in some countries, 
postponement has pushed the mean age of women at the birth of their first child to 
almost 30 years. An interesting attempt to influence the timing of births was made 
in Bulgaria, where this indicator was below 25 years of age in 2005. As part of a 
recently adopted Law on Student Loans, which inter alia aimed at improving 
access to higher education, the Bulgarian Government made provisions to cancel 
the student loans for university students who had a second child within six years 
after graduation. On the positive side, such a measure could help enhance human 
capital in the country as it is aimed at better educated parents. As mentioned 
earlier, it could also contribute to increasing period fertility indicators (or at least 
prevent a further decline of period fertility indicators due to postponement). On 
the negative side, early childbearing might imply that parents have a lower 
income and fewer assets and could impede efforts to address child poverty, which 
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is a serious issue in many of the former communist countries (see UNICEF 2006). 
In fact, part of the difference between old and new Member States reported by the 
European Commission in terms of child vs. old-age poverty (see European 
Commission 2007) is probably due to earlier childbearing in the new Member 
States. In addition, while increasing the period indicators of fertility in the short 
run, lowering the age at birth will, in the long run, accentuate the effects of 
‘below-replacement’ fertility on population growth, particularly in a setting like 
Bulgaria where the net reproduction rate is very low and the mean generational 
length is short. Finally, in a context where the move towards a more flexible life 
course is an exigency of longer-life societies, policies to influence the timing of 
births could introduce rigidities, which might interfere with the policies aimed at 
facilitating the flexibilisation of the life course. 
The above examples demonstrate that policies aimed at influencing fertility 
have to be based on solid evidence and analysis if they are to be efficient and 
effective. Unfortunately, the need for carefully designed and implemented long-
term population policies often falls victim to political expediency and the limited 
time horizon implied by election cycles. Moreover, the academic community 
often fails to provide timely and policy-relevant research and analysis that could 
guide the policy development process. These examples also lead over to the next 
question. 
 
Is the best population policy to have none? 
Some are still questioning the raison d’être of population policy (for a recent 
example see Lawson 2008). However, such viewpoints usually reduce this policy 
to coercive measures taken to influence fertility levels. Interpreting population 
policy more broadly as the “explicit or implicit measures instituted by a 
government to influence population size, growth, distribution, or composition” 
(Population Reference Bureau 2000, p. 61) makes such a question obsolete, as 
most countries in Europe already have in place policies that belong to this 
category (e.g., policies regulating migration, residence status and naturalisation). 
The question should thus read: What is the place of population policy in the 
context of social and economic policies? Though this issue is of interest to policy 
makers, it is, unfortunately, rarely tackled by the research community. One of the 
first to address it was Gunnar Myrdal, a Noble-Prize-winning economist who was 
part of both the academic and the policy-making worlds. In the 1930s, he argued 
that population policy would simply be “an intensification of the important part of 
social policy which bears upon the family and children” (Myrdal 1940, p. 205). 
One could go further and argue that population policy needs to become an integral 
part of modern social policies. This will allow governments to better formulate 
the objectives of this policy, better envisage implications for and ensure 
coherence with other policy domains and facilitate the choice of appropriate 
policy instruments.  Demographic Debate  32 
This raises yet another question, namely how to ensure coherence between 
population policy and other policy domains, as policies to enhance fertility can 
only be effective and efficient if their objectives and means are coherent and 
consistent with the objectives and means of other policy domains. This is yet 
another issue, which policy makers are very much attuned to but researchers 
rarely address (as, by definition, this would imply an interdisciplinary approach 
and disciplinary boundaries are often difficult to cross). 
 
How could policies help society to better accommodate the new demographic 
realities? 
Finally, I would argue that the question of whether policies can enhance fertility 
in Europe needs to be asked in conjunction with how policies could help our 
societies to better accommodate the new demographic realities. Over the past 
centuries, most European populations experienced a long spell of demographic 
growth during which they not only increased numerically but also spilled over to 
settle at least two of the other six continents (Australia and North America) and 
contributed, in varying degrees, to the demographic profile of the other four 
continents. Now Europe is facing a period of negative population growth and the 
age pyramid of its populations most probably will never be ‘pyramidal’ again. 
This is the corollary of changes in reproductive behaviour, of shifts in morbidity 
and mortality and, last but not least, it is accompanied by intensified territorial 
mobility, specifically international migration. 
It seems that we still find it difficult to come to terms with the width and 
depth of these changes. We still focus too much on how to ‘beat’ the new 
demographic realities back into the old social institutions and into our old notions 
of what population trends and patterns should be. Instead, the new realities call 
for a change of paradigm—the current premise that population trends have to be 
moulded to existing social institutions needs to be combined with a concern for 
ways to adapt the social institutions to the new demographic realities. While some 
of the processes and structures underlying these realities are malleable and can be 
influenced by policies, others are here to stay in the long run, so our societies 
need to change and adapt to them. In this context, the distinction between 
‘mitigation’ and ‘adaptation’ policies, which Wolfgang Lutz brought from the 
global warming debate, is of particular importance in providing analytical clarity 
in the discussions on population policy (Lutz 2007). Lutz noted that policies 
addressing population ageing have focused almost exclusively on adaptation 
strategies, which take demographic change as given. He argued that “somehow 
mitigation strategies to population ageing are currently (still) considered terribly 
politically incorrect” (ibid, p.  21). Population ageing has certainly been an 
exception from the prevailing paradigm, as most of the attention in this case has 
focused not on reversing the process (as is the case with declining fertility levels, 
undesirable migration patterns or decreasing population growth) but on adapting 
the social security or health care systems to the changing age distributions. It Nikolai Botev  33 
seems there are at least two reasons (in addition to political correctness) for this 
state of affairs. One is that population ageing is the corollary of changes in 
fertility and mortality (and hence mitigation policies as such are aimed directly at 
the individual components of population change). The second is that the debate on 
the policies related to population ageing was framed largely by economists, who 
turned it into one of the main battlegrounds between neo-liberals and Keynesians, 
and focused it primarily on social security reform (in particular the juxtaposition 
between public PAYG vs. private funded pension systems, while the underlying 
issue is how to better balance contributions and benefits, rather than whether to 
finance a pension system on a funded or PAYG basis, or whether to manage it 
privately or publicly). 
 
Concluding remarks 
It is difficult to provide a straightforward answer to the question posed by the 
VID’s 2007 international conference. There are still important gaps in our 
knowledge and understanding of the causality underlying fertility trends. We also 
lack an adequate grasp of what would be the best policy instruments to influence 
reproductive behaviour. This contribution attempted to briefly address some of 
the questions that arise on the policy development side when it comes to 
enhancing fertility (including the place of population policy in the framework of 
social and economic policies, the need for coherence across different policy 
domains and a suggested change in the population policy paradigm). One aspect 
of policy development was only alluded to but merits further elaboration, namely 
the importance of solid evidence and analysis to guide policy formulation and the 
associated issue of interaction between policy makers and the research 
community in the policy development process. All sides agree on the importance 
and an increasing number of events and forums aim at serving as a platform for 
exchange between policy makers and researchers. Unfortunately, dialogue and 
exchange as such are difficult to achieve, as the two sides tend to speak different 
languages. Both sides will have to make an effort, if this is to change. The 
academic community needs to become better aware of the exigencies of the policy 
formulation process and get accustomed to presenting the results of its work in a 
more policy-relevant way. Among the changes needed on the policy makers’ side 
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